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 
Abstract—The rapid expansion of available online services has 
raised concerns about user privacy. As a response to this concern, EU 
Parliament has recently approved General Data Protection 
Regulation, which aims to give citizens back control of their personal 
data. Built upon a recently developed token-based recommendation 
method (UPCV), we introduce in this paper a novel approach of 
networking collaborative recommendation engines and present the 
first results of a series of studies regarding its capability to protect 
user privacy. 
 
Keywords—data protection, general data protection regulation, 
privacy, recommendations, targeted advertising, upcv.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
HILE recommendations have become an integral part of 
successful web services, the rapid expansion of 
available online services has raised concerns about user 
privacy. Ironically, at the same time when users get added 
value by successful recommendations, helping them to 
discover and organize vast amounts of content, services and 
offerings, the same information also threatens their privacy. 
For example, recommendations play a fundamental role in 
targeted advertising, while targeted adverts may feel too 
intrusive from privacy point of view. 
On a global scale, personal data is stored in and transferred 
between numerous services, companies and countries, with 
inconsistent legislation. Eventually, users do not know where 
their data is stored, and which pieces of it, and the ethics, how 
it will be eventually used. 
After four years of work, EU Parliament approved on April 
14th 2016 new EU data protection rules, which aim to give 
citizens control of their personal data [1]. These rules are 
known as General Data Protection Regulation, or “GDPR”. 
GDPR defines globally how to deal with any data regarding 
EU citizens, no matter where it is processed and stored. Unlike 
EU directives, the provisions in the regulation will be directly 
applicable in all member states after two years, without either 
requiring any national legislation or allowing local 
modification. The same exact regulation will apply 
everywhere simultaneously. 
This paper presents a study on a collaborative token-based 
recommendation method (UPCV) [2] that creates an 
interoperable abstraction layer for both user preferences and 
 
Ville Ollikainen is with the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, 
02150 Espoo, Finland  
Valtteri Niemi is with the Department of Computer Science, University of 
Helsinki, 00014 Helsinki, Finland  
. 
item properties. This layer separates user data from item data, 
enabling distributed ownership and storage, including true 
ownership of personal data. At the same time all actions 
become bilateral between a user and a service. As such the 
approach relates to multi-domain collaborative filtering 
proposed by [3] and cross-domain recommendations proposed 
by [4] by addressing sparsity problems that are often 
experienced in single domain collaborative recommenders. 
The general goal is to improve the performance of 
recommendations in all domains simultaneously. 
The token-based abstraction layer also provides 
independence from domain knowledge: When it comes to 
collecting and using personal data, some approaches, such as 
[5], suggest storing personal profiles in a database in order to 
enable authorized parties to provide personalized services and 
user control upon whom to trust. However, after this point 
these services provide only little privacy. 
Furthermore, privacy concerns have been raised because of 
several recommendation/targeting systems integrate personal 
usage data from multiple services. In legacy approaches, such 
as tracking cookies, it is often possible to identify people 
visiting service A, if they have been visiting service B before.  
Despite recent development in distributed and cloud 
computing, single repositories pose an inherent problem in 
terms of scalability, while they also are single points of failure 
from technical and privacy perspectives. The presented token-
based method is capable of operating bilaterally between a 
single user and a single service, each utilizing their own 
computing resources and making the approach inherently 
scalable. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II 
provides preliminaries about our use case, i.e. about ISBN 
semantics, Book-Crossing dataset and a token-based 
recommender. It also includes a brief introduction to relevant 
privacy concepts. In Section III we introduce a networked 
exchange mechanism of randomly generated tokens, and 
explain how the mechanism is used for recommendation 
purposes. Section IV describes our study with the dataset, 
while results are presented in Section V. Conclusions and 
discussions about future directions are included in Section VI. 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
A. Recommendations 
The recommendation problem can be defined as estimating 
the user’s response to new items based on historical 
information stored in the system, and suggesting novel and 
original items for which the predicted response for that user is 
high [6]. Prediction of user interests is traditionally based on 
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demographic data, such as age, sex, income level and 
matrimonial status. The availability of more data has led to 
more sophisticated recommending algorithms being proposed 
in the literature, most commonly classified into two basic 
categories: content-based and collaborative recommendations. 
Content-based recommenders are based on representing the 
items with a set of attributes and using these attributes to find 
the most relevant content for a particular user. When it comes 
to networking different recommendation engines, content-
based recommenders need content analysis and domain 
specific vocabulary, making them less usable for general use 
as such. For instance, music requires quite a different 
vocabulary than text; how to make them interoperable? 
Collaborative recommendations, on the other hand, learn 
from the behavior of users without any need to analyze items. 
Instead, they recommend items that have been preferred by 
users who have had similar behavior in the past. Collaborative 
recommendations are based on the intuition that people tend to 
like similar items, e.g. people who have liked a particular book 
or movie are likely to have the same taste also for other items, 
compared to taste of all people in average. As a challenge in 
collaborative methods, they can hardly recommend any new 
items that no-one else has accessed before, making them less 
useful as the sole method for presenting items to users. Also, 
most common collaborative methods are based on sparse 
matrices in which users and items intersect; from these legacy 
matrices it is difficult to separate item-only and user-only data. 
B. Token-based recommender 
A recently developed token-based recommendation method 
[2] associates both users and items with collections of tokens, 
each token carrying a random value. The method addresses the 
problem of sharing personal data with the help of storing the 
personal data as a collection of random values that we call 
“tokens”, instead of explicit profiles. Thus, token collections 
provide an abstraction which is privacy-preserving by design.  
Unlike cookies and other tracking means, tokens have no 
association with the real world. In particular, they do not have 
any association with persons. Tokens are mere random values 
that will be copied to and eventually deleted from collections. 
Interaction between a user and an item triggers randomly 
selected tokens that are copied from the token collection of the 
user to the token collection of the item, and vice versa. When 
the same user interacts with several items, or the same item is 
involved in interactions with several users, tokens spread 
around, resulting in similarities among different token 
collections in the system. Since tokens spread in user-item 
interactions only, it is likely that similarities between two 
token sets originate from similar user behavior. The method is 
collaborative by nature and requires no content analysis. 
Since tokens are exchanged in each transaction, collections 
are dynamic by nature, yet they can be universally compared, 
creating a foundation for collaborative recommendations that 
can be used for multiple purposes. This enables behavioral 
recommendations, personalized services and targeted 
advertising, which are the most important application areas for 
personal data. 
Tokenized profiles provide an abstraction layer that is at the 
core of our approach. We will use an example to explain how 
the tokens work, and how they are able to provide 
personalized services, which are recommendations in the 
example presented in Fig. 1. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
(e) 
 
(f) 
Fig. 1 Token exchange in an exemplary case of two users and two 
services. 
 
Step (a) in  Fig. 1 illustrates a simple case where there are 
two independent services on the top, the upper service 
(“service 1”) having just a single item (“item X”) and the 
lower service (“service 2”) having multiple items, including 
“item Y”. Only two users, “Alice” and “Bob”, are presented 
for simplicity; in real life the method requires a number of 
users, since it is based on statistical phenomena caused by 
similarly behaving users. In the beginning each user and item 
has a random number, or “token”, in their collections. 
The different steps illustrate a sequence of actions by Alice 
and Bob. In step (b), Alice is accessing item X. If item X 
would be an online news article, “access” would mean 
clicking it using a web browser. This will trigger a token 
exchange procedure in which a couple of tokens are copied 
from the user to the item and vice versa. Since both Alice and 
item X have only one token each in the beginning, these are 
the tokens to be exchanged. 
After this action, in (c), both Alice and item X have 
common tokens. (In the table, bold typography highlights the 
most recently acquired tokens.) It should be noted that these 
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tokens are random values only, thus they do not carry any 
history with them; we claim that after a while it is impossible 
to say from where item X and Alice got their tokens. 
Next, Bob is accessing the same item X in the first service, 
and once again a couple of tokens are copied over (step d); 
this time item X is able to provide more than one token. After 
Bob’s action it should be noted that Bob and Alice have 
similar tokens, as can be seen in step (e). Again, similarity 
exists in the data without any clue for its reason. 
Still in step (e), Bob is accessing item Y in the second 
service. A couple of tokens are requested for exchange; since 
Bob has more than one token to give, some tokens are picked 
randomly from his collection. 
As the last action in this example, Alice requests a 
recommendation for herself from the second service, which 
she is now visiting the very first time (step f) The query 
contains at least part of her tokens, in this example all of them. 
Finally, service 2 goes through all available items and 
compares their tokens with the provided tokens to create 
recommendations: The recommended item is the one that 
corresponds to the token collection with maximum Jaccard 
similarity. Jaccard similarity is a well know measure for 
comparing similarities of two sets. It is defined as the ratio of 
two numbers: size of the intersection of the two sets and size 
of their union.  
There is a substantial likelihood that item Y will be in the 
recommendation list, since there are tokens in common. 
In real cases collections may carry hundreds of tokens for 
each user and item, and the amount of exchanged tokens may 
vary e.g. between 0.5% and 15%, depending on the 
application; the percentage refers to the amount of tokens on 
sending side. Also, it is possible to create only one initial 
token for each new user and item, yet there can also be more 
than one initial token, say 32 of them. 
There may be different strategies in processing tokens. At 
its simplest, when a collection reaches its maximum size, 
tokens can be deleted on a random basis in order to make 
space, eventually deleting also the initial tokens. Furthermore, 
tokens may expire at a certain time, but in a limited 
experiment this feature can be omitted.  
C. International Standard Book Number 
ISBN is a hierarchical book identifier which contains 
agency, publisher and publication codes. Agencies are 
typically country-based, for instance Japanese agency 
allocates publisher codes in Japan. As exceptions to this rule, 
English, French and German languages are under their own 
specific agency codes. In addition, Germany as a country has 
its own agency.  Each code is associated with exactly one 
agency but several codes may be associated with the same 
agency. 
D. Book-Crossing dataset 
The Book-Crossing (BX) dataset is collected from a “Book-
Crossing” literature exchange service, based on leaving books 
in public places to be found by other potential readers. Each 
book has a sticker with instructions about, what to do when 
found. 
The BX [7] dataset is commonly used for developing and 
validating collaborative filtering methods. BX contains three 
different tables: “BX-Users” containing 278,859 users, “BX-
Books” with 271,379 valid books and “BX-Ratings” of 
1,149,780 user “ratings”, sorted by user id. It should be noted 
that users have entered ISBN’s without validation, so a 
percentage of ISBN’s in “BX-Ratings” are invalid. 
In the dataset there are two types of “ratings”, “implicit” 
(value 0) and “explicit” (values 1-10, 10 being the best). 
“Implicit ratings” count for 62% of all “ratings” (716,109 
instances). The minority of ratings, 433,671, are explicit. 
BX is referring to books by their ISBN, thus indicating also 
the agency under which they have been published. 
E. Privacy and deniability 
One of the fundamental principles of privacy design is that 
personally identifiable information is not collected without 
user consent. Furthermore, when giving the consent, the user 
should understand why the information is collected. Naturally, 
the collected information can only be used for purposes which 
the user has given consent. 
In an ideal privacy-preserving setting, collected data should 
not provide any further information about individuals even 
when combined with extra information. This principle is also 
behind GDPR: if any information can be associated with a 
user even by someone else, it is no longer anonymous data; it 
becomes personal data. 
A weaker form is deniability which means that the collected 
data may provide some probability information about 
individuals but at minimum a reasonable doubt would remain 
about whether the information is true. This would enable the 
individual to successfully deny correctness of the information. 
III. A TOKEN-BASED RECOMMENDER SYSTEM 
Since token exchange leaves no traces of the origin of 
tokens, we assume in general that it is fairly safe to disclose 
tokens to third parties without disclosing any history. 
In the example presented in Fig. 1 the system consisted of 
two independent services that had nothing in common, except 
two users. All token exchange took place bilaterally, between 
a user and a service, without common repositories or 
computing facilities.  
Instead of one recommender, let’s now illustrate two 
recommenders (Fig. 2). Since all token exchange takes place 
between a user and an item in a service, we can now divide the 
item set into two separate sets without affecting token 
exchange operations: when a user is accessing any item in set 
1, token exchange is carried out by recommendation engine 1, 
and the same goes for set 2 and recommendation engine 2. Of 
course, when making a query for recommendations, the 
recommendations may cover only the items within the 
particular service. 
 
 
Fig. 2 A recommendation engine divided into two. 
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Otherwise, a recommendation engine can be divided. From 
a user’s point of view, this means that independent 
recommendation engines act as a single recommendation 
engine as far as token exchange is considered. 
Fig. 3 expands this concept a bit further illustrating an 
exemplary setup in which users X and Z aggregate their 
tokens in a public library service, while user Y gets his tokens 
from an online video service. Since service 1 and service 2 
have at least one user in common, tokens are compatible in 
these services. In this illustration there is also a dating service 
into which users can upload their tokens, requesting the 
recommendation engine X to find other users with similar 
tokens (something in common, that is). 
We could easily continue this expansion into a scenario in 
which users can aggregate their token collections in numerous 
services, and numerous services can benefit from user tokens 
provided to them in order to offer better user experience. 
 
 
Fig. 3 A token based recommendation engine system 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. Preparing BX data 
We used ISBN agencies in the “BX-ratings” table to create 
our training and validation sets. First, we ignored ratings and 
filtered out invalid ISBN’s, resulting in 1,135,377 ratings. 
Second, we converted agency codes to agencies, with the 
exception that the agency code for “German language” was 
mapped to “Germany”, and using the conversion we replaced 
ISBN’s by agencies. Third, we removed one-time users, 
resulting in 1,077,310 ratings. Fourth, we shuffled the ratings 
to random order and got our transaction data set.  
In our evaluation we imported the transaction data set into 
the token-based recommendation engine as two independent 
test cases with the following parameters. The maximum size 
of each collection was 1024 tokens; in each transaction 
0.58%+1 (i.e. at most 6) randomly selected tokens were 
copied in both directions. In the first test case each user and 
item got a single initial token; in the second test case we 
created 32 initial tokens. 
B. Privacy aspects  
Privacy features should be defined with respect to adversary 
models. In such a model we first describe what the capabilities 
of an attacker are and what he may try to do. For instance, we 
could allow the adversary to observe all tokens that are 
exchanged between different parties while the target is to 
determine which token exchanges are carried out by the same 
party. In other words, the adversary tries to break unlinkability 
between different transactions. 
In our system there is no need to allow outside observers to 
gain access to the tokens that are exchanged. This could be 
guaranteed by transferring all tokens inside encrypted 
communications. For example, we could define the mandatory 
use of a secure protocol, for instance HTTPS, in all 
communications related to tokens. 
Another adversary model could allow disclosing all tokens 
of all parties to the attacker. In this scenario the target of the 
attacker would be to determine which parties have been in 
contact with each other. If a recommender system would be 
built upon an assumption that at least some parties make their 
tokens public, this adversary model would not be relevant.  
In reality, there will be services that are trusted by users to 
an extent that a portion of users have disclosed their identities 
to the service under explicit consent. For instance, access to 
online archives of a weekly magazine may be associated to the 
subscription of the paper format, with specific name, address 
and other contact information. Since there is a trust relation 
between the service and these users, privacy is a lesser issue. 
However, there will be a myriad of services where users 
just pop in, check something and leave. In these services it 
will be safer for users to disclose as few tokens as possible, 
especially if no recommendations are requested. 
In our methodology we concentrate on studying, whether a 
non-trusted service can detect returning users by their tokens. 
C. Evaluating privacy in terms of successfully detecting a 
returning customer 
In our study we present a scenario in which the BX 
agencies mimic real world services. In this scenario we create 
agency-to-agency recommendations by comparing token 
collections of different agencies; therefore agencies would 
need to reveal their token collections to each other.  
We could alternatively use a trusted third party who would 
receive a view of every agency’s tokens and who is expected 
to provide recommendations in return. This would put this 
trusted third party into an excellent position as an adversary 
but we would still trust that it would not use its position 
against any party in the system. Even in this case there would 
be no need to see readers’ tokens, not even by the trusted 
party.  
In our example scenario it is assumed that the agencies do 
not want to retain their privacy against the readers. On the 
contrary, each agency would prefer engaging with as many 
readers as possible, and it would be beneficial for the agency 
to use its own identity e.g. for reputation. However, we expect 
that readers want to remain anonymous towards agencies.  
Now we may describe an attack against readers’ privacy 
that could not be eliminated either by usage of HTTPS 
connections for the purpose of hiding token exchanges or by 
usage of a trusted third party for the purpose of computing 
recommendations. The attacker is a single agency (in our case 
the one responsible for French language books) who keeps a 
record of tokens received from various readers and tries to 
determine which of the transactions are initiated by the same 
reader. In a certain sense this kind of attacker can be classified 
as an “honest-but-curious” adversary. 
Please note that if the readers would not try to remain 
anonymous, and would use their permanent identities instead 
of tokens when communicating with the agency, it would be 
trivial for the agency to determine which transactions would 
be with the same reader. Thus we consider, what could be 
disclosed from tokens alone. 
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We run a simulation of token exchanges with the BX 
dataset and chose one relatively popular agency as the 
adversary. Then we took the point of view of the adversary 
and, for each pair of transactions, compared tokens exchanged.  
V. RESULTS 
The vast majority of the transaction pairs did not have any 
tokens in common. On the other hand, the vast majority of 
transaction pairs were such that the two transactions were 
done by two different readers.  
These two observations were by no means surprising. We 
put our focus on those pairs of transactions where common 
tokens were found. The portion of pairs carried out by the 
same reader was considerably bigger among this set of pairs 
than among all pairs of transactions. But still the portion of 
pairs carried out by the same reader was smaller than the 
portion of pairs carried out by two different users. More 
specifically, in the case of 32 initial tokens, around 41 % of 
pairs with common tokens were carried out by the same reader 
while around 59 % were carried out by two different readers. 
In the case of one initial token the corresponding figures are 
17 % (same reader) and 83 % (different reader). 
This finding serves as strong evidence for the claim that our 
token exchange mechanism is indeed privacy-preserving. 
We separately studied those pairs that had at least two 
tokens in common, which led to different results. In the case 
of 32 initial tokens more than 99 % of the pairs were such that 
both transactions were done by the same reader while less than 
1% was such that the two transactions were done by different 
readers. In the case of one initial token the corresponding 
figures were 95 % (same reader) and 5 % (different readers). 
Moreover, all pairs that had at least three common tokens were 
such that both transactions were done by the same reader. 
(This holds for both cases of 32 initial tokens and one initial 
token.) Actually the main reason for this phenomena was the 
fact that the amount of transactions where the reader provided 
more than one token to an agency were in a small minority, 
carried out by a handful of the most active readers. 
One conclusion from the simulation is that the number of 
tokens exchanged should not depend on how many tokens the 
parties possess but should rather be kept constant. Otherwise, 
the number of tokens sent could be an even better indicator 
(than the tokens themselves) of the fact that two transactions 
are done by the same reader. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
We have studied privacy aspects of a method of creating 
recommendations by exchanging random-looking tokens. Use 
of a secure channel for protecting token exchanges (e.g. by 
HTTPS protocol) provides privacy protection against outside 
observers. Use of a trusted party for computation of 
recommendations would remove the need of making tokens 
public between different services. Finally, we studied to what 
extent a single service is able to break the privacy of its users. 
One can ask, in respect to GDPR, are tokens truly 
anonymous data? From the point of view of this study we can 
say that if a service (agency) does not memorize token 
transactions, but merely stores the tokens in the form of 
modified token collections, a returning individual user can’t be 
detected. Memorizing tokens would require user consent in the 
spirit of GDPR, since there is a possibility to detect returning 
users from the crowd. However, even in that adverse case, 
users have a degree of privacy, since detection is not definite. 
In the future we are going to study privacy properties more 
thoroughly in different adversary models. We are also 
planning to find various trade-offs between recommendation 
performance and privacy preservation by changing the 
parameters and functionality in the token exchange 
mechanism, specifically how to select outgoing tokens. 
Measuring privacy from simulations in various data sets is 
another important future direction. 
REFERENCES   
[1] European Parliament News, “Data protection reform - Parliament 
approves new rules fit for the digital era”, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu, REF: 20160407IPR21776 
[2] V. Ollikainen, A. Mensonen, M. Tavakolifard, “UPCV Distributed 
recommendation system based on token exchange,” Journal of Print and 
Media Technology Research, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 195 – 201, 2013. 
Available at http://www.vtt.fi/inf/julkaisut/muut/2013/ 
OA_JPMTR_1314_Ollikainen.pdf 
[3] Y. Zhang., B. Cao, D.-Y. Yeung, ”Multi-domain collaborative filtering”. 
arXiv Preprint arXiv:1203.3535. 2012 
[4] S. Gao, H. Luo, D. Chen,  S. Li, P. Gallinari, J. Guo, “Cross-domain 
recommendation via cluster-level latent factor model,” Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, 8189 LNAI(PART 2), 161-176. doi:10.1007/978-3-
642-40991-2_11. 2013 
[5] T. Kirkham, S. Winfield, S. Ravet, S.  Kellomaki, “The personal data 
store approach to personal data security,” IEEE Security and Privacy, 
11(5), pp. 12-19. 2013. 
[6] C. Desrosiers, G. Karypis, ”A Comprehensive Survey of Neighborhood-
based Recommendation Methods,” Boston, MA: Springer US, pp. 107-
144. 2011. 
[7] C.-N. Ziegler, S.M. McNee, J.A. Konstan, G. Lausen, “Improving 
Recommendation Lists Through Topic Diversification,”  Proceedings of 
the 14th International World Wide Web Conference (WWW '05), May 
10-14, 2005, Chiba, Japan 
 
International Journal of Humanities and Management Sciences (IJHMS) Volume 4, Issue 4 (2016) ISSN 2320–4044 (Online) 
344
